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ALIEN INVASION: CORPORATE LIABILITY AND ITS REAL
IMPLICATIONS UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Brian Jacek

*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is part of the Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789, which provides in its entirety: “The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction in any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
1
States.” Unlike other legislative enactments from the same time
period, Congress provided virtually no legislative history in
2
formulating the ATS. Instead, the text of the ATS itself is all lawyers
3
For nearly two
and historians have to interpret its meaning.
4
centuries, this brief statute was largely forgotten and rarely invoked.
In the early 1980s, however, human-rights groups began to use the
5
ATS as a mechanism for bringing human-rights lawsuits. Since then,
district and circuit courts have tried, with extensive disagreement, to
6
determine the meaning and scope of the ATS. The Supreme Court
*
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1
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
2
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718–19 (2004). Sosa was the first
Supreme Court case to address the ATS. Id. There, the Justices went to great lengths
to evaluate the history behind the ATS and to attempt to provide some insight into
what the original Congress intended the Statute to mean. See id.
3
Id.
4
See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In one of
the most recent circuit court cases involving the ATS, the D.C. Circuit in Doe VIII
analyzed the history of ATS cases and the development of the corresponding legal
doctrines. See id.
5
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
6
See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.
2010), cert. granted, No. 10-1491, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct. 17, 2011); Abdullahi v.
Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303
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7

purported to clarify the ATS, but in reality, its decision only created
8
more questions.
One open question generating considerable attention is whether
corporations can be sued under the ATS for torts occurring in
9
10
foreign countries. Circuit courts are bitterly split over the issue,
11
prompting a plethora of scholarly debate and public concern.
Corporations fear that their liability under the ATS will result in huge
12
expenses and judgments and reduce their investments and profits.
But the issue of corporate liability concerns not only victims of
human-rights abuses and corporations, but also much larger issues of
13
human-rights law, foreign relations, and corporate responsibility. In
assessing whether corporations can be sued under the ATS, courts
must first decide whether international or domestic law governs the
14
question. Second, courts must address whether that body of law
15
recognizes corporate liability.
In Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (Doe VIII), the D.C. Circuit joined the
Eleventh Circuit in holding that corporations can be sued under the
16
ATS. In arriving at its conclusion, the court held that it must look at
U.S. law, rather than the law of nations, to determine if corporations
17
could be sued under the ATS. Essentially, the court held that under
the ATS international law must recognize the tort alleged in the
18
complaint, but U.S. law governs the question of who can be sued.
The court noted in dicta that, even if it were to apply international
law to the question of who can be held liable under the ATS, it would

(11th Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2005); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876; Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
7
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692.
8
See infra Part IV.
9
See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 15.
10
Circuit Judges within the same circuit often find themselves at odds with their
colleagues. See, e.g., Doe VIII, 654 F.3d 11; Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111. Moreover, there is
wide split between circuits that allow corporations to be sued under the ATS and
circuits that do not. See, e.g., id.
11
Cf. Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 18–20 (discussing the history of ATS claims and the
disagreement about its applicability to corporations).
12
There are, perhaps, good reasons to fear these things. See infra Part IV.
13
See infra Part V.
14
See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41.
15
See id.
16
Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 15.
17
Id. at 41.
18
Id.
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19

still arrive at the same conclusion. The D.C. Circuit’s holding stands
in stark contrast to the Second Circuit’s conclusion in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co. that international law governs the inquiry of who
20
can be sued under the ATS. The Supreme Court has now granted
certiorari and heard arguments in Kiobel and has the opportunity to
resolve the question of whether corporations can be sued under the
21
ATS.
Large multi-national corporations are terrified about the
22
implications of corporate liability under the ATS. Specifically, they
fear that corporate liability under the ATS may result in more
frequent and more costly judgments, bad press, and may stymie
23
corporate activity in developing countries.
Fearful that liability
under the ATS would result in a kind of corporate armageddon,
corporations have challenged corporate liability under the ATS
24
through the courts. This Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit is
correct that corporations can be held liable under the ATS.
Furthermore, this Comment argues that corporate liability under the
ATS will not be as detrimental as many corporate leaders and
scholars contend. Instead, corporate liability under the ATS is in line
with legal precedent and facilitates domestic, foreign, and humanrights policy goals. Corporate liability under the ATS facilitates these
goals without severely and negatively impacting business interests and
development, both at home and abroad.
Part II of this Comment briefly addresses the history of the ATS
and recent developments in ATS jurisprudence, including the circuit
split on corporate liability. Part III analyzes the Doe VIII decision in
detail by examining both the majority and dissenting opinions.
Then, Part IV argues that the D.C. Circuit decided correctly in Doe
VIII that domestic law rather than international law governs the
question of who can be liable under the ATS. Even if the D.C. Circuit
was incorrect in deciding the case under domestic law, international
law still recognizes corporate liability.
Part V examines the
19

Id. at 49.
See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 127.
21
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct.
17, 2011) (granting certiorari).
22
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 1 (2003) (“This one-sentence law . . . could plausibly
culminate in a nightmare, more than 200 years after it was enacted.”).
23
See id.
24
See, e.g., Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Kiobel,
621 F.3d at 111.
20
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implications of holding corporations liable under the ATS and will
argue that doing so will not detrimentally and unjustly affect business.
Moreover, corporate liability, in limited cases, will serve human rights
and foreign relations public policy goals. Part VI concludes,
reiterating that both domestic and international law permit
corporations to be sued under the ATS and that such a rule is not
contrary to corporate or political concerns.
II. HISTORY OF AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ATS JURISPRUDENCE
25

The First Congress passed the ATS in 1789. There are many
interpretations of the murky history behind its development and
subsequent adoption. The predominant narrative is that the ATS is
the product of the realization that, at the founding of the nation,
state courts were not properly equipped to handle judicial matters
26
As a result, some scholars and
involving foreign nations.
commentators argue that the ATS was structured to bring matters of
international importance into the federal courts in order to prevent
27
mishandling in the state courts. Other scholars posit more generally
that the ATS arose out of the inability of the Continental Congress to
deal with issues of international importance, thereby damaging the
28
new nation’s reputation abroad. These scholars argue that it was
necessary to provide a forum in which international claims could be
addressed in order to boost respect for the fledgling democracy, both
29
politically and economically.
Finally, some other scholars argue
that, in fact, the meaning of the ATS can only be perceived through
25

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring); Carolyn A. D’Amore, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Alien
Tort Statute: How Wide Has the Door to Human Rights Litigation Been Left Open?, 39
AKRON L. REV. 593, 597 (2006).
27
See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782 (Edwards, J., concurring); D’Amore, supra note
26, at 597.
28
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716–17 (2004); see Respublica v.
DeLongchamps, 1 Dall. 111, 1 L. Ed. 59 (O. T. Phila. 1784). The Sosa Court claims
that the ATS arose out of the Marbois incident of May 1784, in which a Frenchman
verbally assaulted the Secretary of the French Legion in Philadelphia. Sosa, 542 U.S.
at 716–17 (citing Respublica, 1 Dall.). Until that point, Congress had not vested the
courts with power to deal with matters arising out of or pertaining to the law of
nations. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717. Frustrated with the court’s inability to deal with
the issue, the French launched a formal protest with the new government. See id.
Worried that the incident may cause international backlash and undermine the new
nation’s credibility, Congress decided to include in the new Judiciary Act a provision
that would become known as the ATS. See id.
29
D’Amore, supra note 26.
26
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an understanding of what the words in the ATS meant at the time of
30
its drafting. According to these scholars, the word “foreigner” was
changed to “alien” during drafting, which reflects a conscious
decision by the Founders to include only people who would have
been considered “aliens” under the eighteenth-century meaning of
that word, i.e., only individuals born in other nations but residing in
31
the United States. Few courts or academics, however, give this view
credence.
Whatever its original purpose, plaintiffs rarely used the ATS; in
32
fact, district courts applied it only twice between 1789–1980. The
ATS remained largely forgotten or ignored until 1980, when the
33
Second Circuit applied the ATS in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. There, a
dissident Paraguayan family, the Filartigas, brought an action against
Américo Norberto Peña-Irala (Peña), who allegedly tortured and
34
killed their son, Joelito.
The Filartigas commenced a criminal
action in Paraguayan courts, which failed because of the hostile
35
political environment there. When Joelito’s sister Dolly came to the
United States to seek asylum, she learned that her brother’s
36
murderer, Peña, was residing in the United States. As a result, she
filed suit in the United States under the ATS claiming that Peña
caused Joelito’s wrongful death by torture in violation of the law of
37
nations.
Applying the ATS for the first time in a circuit court, the Second
Circuit held that the Filartigas’s claims had merit under international
38
law. Specifically, the court held that the law of nations prohibits
torture, and as a result, the Filartigas could bring their action against

30

M. Anderson Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original
Language of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 316, 320–21 (2009).
31
Berry, supra note 30 (arguing that “[i]t is fair to say that an understanding of
what Congress intended by the deceptively simple change from ‘foreigner’ to ‘alien’
was a narrowing of the ATS; making it available to ‘aliens’ but not to ‘foreigners.’ In
other words, making it only available to residents of the United States”). This
argument is given little credence in modern ATS jurisprudence and has never been
discussed in a circuit opinion in depth, largely because it is a new and facially
innocuous.
32
See, e.g., Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.
Cas. 819, F. Cas. No. 1607 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607).
33
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
34
Id. at 878.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 879.
38
Id. at 884.
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39

Peña in the United States under the ATS. As the Supreme Court
described, the Filartiga case was “the birth of the modern line of
40
[ATS] cases.” In essence, the Filartiga case revived the ATS and led
to a number of decisions in the Second Circuit and in other circuits
41
that further developed ATS jurisprudence.
In particular, courts
began to explore the “scope and contours of the ATS” in often hotly
debated and conflicting majority, concurring, and dissenting
42
opinions. Intense disagreement over the interpretation of the ATS
and its applicability in various situations led to a huge divergence
between the circuits and a renewed call for clarification from the
43
Supreme Court.
But clarify it did not. In an opinion by Justice Souter in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held that the ATS is a purely
jurisdictional statute and does not provide a separate cause of
44
action.
Thus, the Court held that the ATS could be used to
establish jurisdiction in a case—but the violation itself must come
45
The defendant in Sosa was a Mexican
from the law of nations.
national and doctor named Alvarez who was indicted in the United
States for the torture and murder of an agent of the U.S. Drug
46
Enforcement Administration in Mexico. The United States hired
Mexican nationals, including Sosa, to abduct Alvarez in Mexico and
bring him to the United States where he was subsequently tried and
47
acquitted.
Upon returning to Mexico, Alvarez brought a claim
39

Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004).
41
See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.
2010), cert. granted, No. 10-1491, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct. 17, 2011); Abdullahi v.
Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303
(11th Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2005); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
42
Nicholas C. Thompson, Putting the Cart Back Behind the Horse: The Future of
Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel, 9 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J.
293, 295 (2001); see Frank Cruz-Alvarez & Laura E. Wade, The Second Circuit Correctly
Interprets the Alien Tort Statute: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1111
(2011).
43
See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 788–89, 796 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (examining the disagreement between Judge Edwards and Judge Bork
about which claims are recognized under the ATS and customary international law
and whether the particular claim was subject to the political question doctrine).
44
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 698.
47
Id.
40
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under the ATS alleging, inter alia, that Sosa had tortured him in
48
violation of the law of nations. The district and circuit courts held
that the ATS created a cause of action for the alleged violation of the
49
law of nations. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the lower
courts erred in reading the ATS to create a separate cause of action
50
for a violation of the law of nations. Instead, the Court held that the
51
ATS is a purely jurisdictional statute. As such, an action “under” the
ATS merely means that a court has jurisdiction to hear a case—a case
it would not have jurisdiction to hear otherwise—by virtue of the
52
ATS. The substance of a claim must be recognized by the law of
53
nations.
The Supreme Court limited the ATS’s jurisdictional breadth by
stating that “at the time of the enactment[,] the jurisdiction enabled
federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the
54
law of nations and recognized at common law.” Thus, “Congress
intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of
actions alleging violations of the law of nations”—which, at least in
55
1789, would have been incorporated into federal common law. This
law would have encompassed the “general norms governing the
behavior of national states with each other” and “a body of judgemade law regulating the conduct of individuals situated outside
56
domestic boundaries.” These general norms and practices accepted
as law by nations are often referred to as customary international
57
law. Thus, the jurisdictional grant of the ATS would require courts
to look only to a limited number of claims that the law of nations, or
58
international law, recognizes. Moreover, the ATS does not specify
59
who can be sued, only what claims are recognized.
48

Id.
Id.
50
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 720; see id. at 713; Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 281, 3 U.S. 199, 1 L. Ed.
568 (1796).
56
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720; see id. at 713; Ware, 3 Dall. at 281, 3 U.S. at 199, 1 L. Ed.
at 568.
57
See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 12, at 17 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed.
1955).
58
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714–15.
59
Brief for International Human Rights Organizations and International Law
Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,
49
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The Court noted that lower courts could look beyond the scope
of customary international law at the time Congress passed the ATS
to determine the scope of the substance of claims, but cautioned that
60
these courts must not go too far. The Court identified five reasons
why courts should be careful when recognizing claims under the ATS.
First, Erie changed prior conceptions of federal common law by
noting that “there is a general understanding that the law is not so
61
much found or discovered as it is either made or created.” Second,
62
Erie eliminated the conception of federal common law. Third, the
Court advised caution in inferring “intent to provide a private cause
63
of action where the statute does not supply one expressly.” Fourth,
the potential implications for U.S. foreign relations in creating new
64
causes of action may be high. Finally, there is no congressional
65
As a result,
mandate to creatively expand the law of nations.
66
violations of international law under the ATS are inherently limited.
The Court recognized that a claim brought under the
international law—or the law of nations—must be sufficiently defined
67
and substantive to be adjudicated in the federal courts.
Justice
Souter then added the now infamous footnote twenty. In full, the
footnote states: “A related consideration is whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a
68
corporation or individual.” The footnote, which was added as an
attempt to explain, has only created more confusion and is cited by
69
courts to both support and reject corporate liability under the ATS.
182 L. Ed. 2d 270 (No. 10-1491), at 22, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/.
60
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (noting that “federal courts should not recognize private
claims under the federal common law for violations of any international law norm
with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted”); see U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
61
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
62
Id. at 726.
63
Id. at 727.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 728.
66
See id.
67
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33 (“[T]he determination whether a norm is sufficiently
definite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an
element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause of
action available to litigants in the federal courts.”).
68
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.20.
69
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see
generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
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If Sosa cleared up the jurisdictional issue, the ambiguous
70
language of footnote twenty in Sosa created more overall confusion.
In particular, courts have fought over the scope of the ATS, both in
terms of what causes of action are recognized under the law of
71
nations and the ATS, and who can be sued under the ATS. The
Supreme Court failed to answer these questions in Sosa, leaving the
72
door wide open for other interpretive cases. In deciding such cases,
other courts have had to address whether corporations can be held
73
liable under the ATS.
In the years following Sosa, there was little agreement over the
74
scope and breadth of the ATS. In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second
Circuit held that state action is not necessarily required for a finding
of a violation of customary international law, and thus private actors
75
may be liable under the ATS. Applying this standard in Khulumani
v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., the Second Circuit agreed that aiding
and abetting is a cognizable claim under the law of nations and the
ATS, but was split as to whether the Kadic holding extended only to
76
private individuals or all private actors including corporations.
Because the parties themselves in Khulumani did not raise the issue of
corporate liability under the ATS, and because there was no
granted, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct. 17, 2011); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163
(2d Cir. 2009); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244
(2d Cir. 2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008);
Khulumani v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2005).
70
See, e.g., Doe VIII, 654 F.3d 11; Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111; Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163;
Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d 244; Romero, 552 F.3d 1303; Khulumani, 504 F.3d
254; Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.
71
See generally, sources cited supra note 6.
72
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33, 733 n.20.
73
See, e.g., Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 50–55; Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128–31.
74
See, e.g., Doe VIII, 654 F.3d 11; Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111; Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163;
Talisman, 582 F.3d 244; Romero, 552 F.3d 1303; Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254; Kadic, 70
F.3d 232.
75
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (holding that “certain forms of conduct violate the laws
of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only
as private individuals.”).
76
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260. Judge Katzmann noted that the court had
“repeatedly treated the issue of whether corporations may be held liable under the
[ATS] as indistinguishable from the question of whether private individuals may be.”
Id. at 282 (Katzmann, J., concurring). Judge Hall agreed that “private parties and
corporate actors are subject to liability under the [ATS].” Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 289
(Hall, J., concurring). Finally, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Korman argued that
international law and norms do not recognize corporate liability and as a result,
corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 326
(Korman, J., dissenting).
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agreement over whether corporations could be sued under the ATS,
the Khulumani decision left the door open for future resolution of
77
the issue.
The Second Circuit was able to avoid the ultimate question of
78
corporate liability until Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum in 2010. In
Kiobel, plaintiffs—residents of Nigeria—claimed that various
corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government in
committing human-rights abuses in violation of the law of nations,
79
using the ATS as a vehicle to get into U.S. courts.
Specifically,
plaintiffs alleged that corporate defendants aided the Nigerian
government in killing, “beating, raping, and arresting residents and
80
destroying property.”
In addressing the threshold question of
whether the corporate defendants could be sued, the Second Circuit
first held that the Supreme Court’s Sosa opinion and footnote twenty
required lower courts to determine who can be sued under the ATS
81
by examining international law. Second, the Second Circuit held
that customary international law does not recognize—indeed flatly
82
rejects—corporate liability as a norm. Thus, the court held that
77

See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260–61.
The Second Circuit declined to answer the question in an earlier case. See
Talisman, 582 F.3d at 244. There, in making its determination that international law
under the ATS recognized aiding and abetting liability, but that such liability
required a purposeful mens rea, the court assumed, without deciding, that
corporations may be held liable under the ATS. Id. at 261 n.12. The court found
that because the plaintiffs’ claims failed to meet the mens rea requirement of
purpose it need not decide “‘whether international law extends the scope of liability’
to corporations.” Id. (quoting Sosa, 524 U.S. at 732 n.20).
79
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117.
80
Id. at 123 (“Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants, inter alia, (1)
provided transportation to Nigerian forces, (2) allowed their property to be utilized
as a staging ground for attacks, (3) provided food for soldiers involved in the attacks,
and (4) provided compensation to those soldiers.”).
81
Id. at 127. The Second Circuit noted that the language of Sosa clearly
mandates analyzing the scope of liability under the ATS by examining international
law. “That language requires that we look to international law to determine our
jurisdiction over ATS claims against a particular class of defendant, such as
corporations.” Id. Furthermore, “‘the norm [of international law] must extend
liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue.’” Id. at
128 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
82
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 134. To determine whether international law recognizes
corporate liability, the court surveyed the following: international conventions,
international custom, general principles of law, and judicial and scholarly opinions.
Id. at 132. Specifically, the court addressed international tribunals such as
Nuremberg and its progeny and determined that these tribunals recognized
individual liability but expressly denied corporate liability. Id. at 135; see The
Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D at 110; 7 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (The Farben Case) 11–60
78
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83

plaintiffs’ claims could not proceed.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Leval agreed that plaintiffs’
claims must fail because under aiding-and-abetting liability, plaintiffs
must prove that the defendants acted with purpose to commit the
84
underlying crime.
He would have found, however, that
85
corporations are liable under the ATS. Judge Leval did not dispute
the majority’s holding that international law governs the question of
who can be held liable under the ATS, but objected to the majority’s
opinion that international law does not allow corporations to be
86
sued. Judge Leval posited that international law is inconclusive on
the question of whether corporations may be sued and thus the court
87
should have looked to domestic law to answer the question. These
conclusions have paved the way for other circuit courts to address the
88
issue of corporate liability and the ATS, most recently in Doe VIII.
III. THE DOE VIII CASE
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Doe VIII came after years of
89
litigation and seven previous Doe decisions. Doe VIII is one of the
latest circuit decisions to join the majority of decisions holding that
corporations can be held liable under the ATS. Its decision stands in
90
stark contrast to the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel. In short,
(1952). The court noted that a proposal to hold corporations liable under the
International Criminal Court was flatly rejected. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136.
83
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145.
84
Id. at 154 (Leval, J., concurring).
85
Id. at 152–53.
86
Id.
87
Id. Judge Leval found that international law is inconclusive because the
majority relies only on international criminal law and not civil law: “Because
international law generally leaves all aspects of the issue of civil liability to individual
nations, there is no rule or custom of international law to award damages in any form
or context, either as to persons or as to juridical ones.” Id.
88
Other courts to consider the ATS and corporate liability include the Eleventh
Circuit in Romero v. Drummond, Ltd., 552 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008)
(holding that “[t]he text of the [ATS] provides no express exception for
corporations . . . and the law of this Circuit is that this statute grants jurisdiction from
complaints of torture against corporate defendants”), the Central District of
California in Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (assuming that
corporations can be held liable under the ATS), and the Seventh Circuit in Flomo v.
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011) (refusing to decide the
issue).
89
See Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005); Doe VII v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 658 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2009); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 14–17 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
90
Compare Doe VIII, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), with Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111 (2d
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the D.C. Circuit held that U.S. law governs the question of who can
be sued under the ATS.
A. Facts
The D.C. Circuit in Doe VIII tackled the same issues that the
Second Circuit addressed in Kiobel. In Doe VIII, plaintiffs—villagers in
Aceh, Indonesia—contended that they were tortured and injured by
Exxon Mobil security forces hired in accordance with an Indonesian
91
government contract. Eleven of the fifteen plaintiffs filed claims
alleging that Exxon’s security forces “committed murder, torture,
sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment in violation of the
(ATS) and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), and various
92
common-law torts.”
The other four plaintiffs asserted claims in
93
violation of common-law torts.
The district court dismissed the
claims under the ATS and the TVPA, but proceeded with the
94
common-law claims, which were eventually dismissed. In the D.C.
Circuit, plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims, and
defendant cross-appealed, raising for the first time its contention that
95
corporations are not liable under the ATS.
B. Majority Opinion
The majority held that Exxon Mobil could be held liable for
96
violations of customary international law under the ATS. In doing
so, the D.C. Circuit explained that U.S law—not international law—
governs the question of who can be sued in a case where jurisdiction
97
is obtained through the ATS.
Even under international law,
98
corporations would still be held liable.
At the outset, the D.C.
Circuit noted that the case was distinguishable from Sosa because Sosa
dealt with whether a particular claim was recognizable under
international law and derivatively under the ATS, while the Doe VIII
99
case deals instead with whether corporations can be sued. The issue
Cir. 2009).
91
Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 14–15.
92
Id. at 15.
93
Id.
94
Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005); Doe VII v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 658 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2009).
95
Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 15.
96
Id. at 15.
97
Id. at 57.
98
Id. at 51–55.
99
Id. at 41.
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in Sosa was whether the alleged arrest and torture could support a
cause of action, and thus the court looked to customary international
100
law. As Sosa made clear, international law determines which causes
101
of action plaintiffs can assert using the ATS. But the Sosa Court did
not address the scope of who can be sued for these violations of
102
international law. Doe VIII, however, dealt with who would be made
103
to pay for the alleged wrong.
The court turned to an example to
illustrate this point: “in legal parlance one does not refer to the tort
of ‘corporate battery’ as a cause of action. The cause of action is
battery; agency law determines whether a principal will pay damages
104
for the battery committed by the principal’s agent.”
Thus, the
proper question here is “whether a corporation can be made to pay
damages for the conduct of its agents in violation of the law of
105
nations.” While customary international law may provide the basis
for determining whether disapproval attaches to certain conduct,
international law does not provide all of the procedural and
underlying law necessary for making a determination under the
106
ATS. Thus, courts must look to federal common law for an answer
to the question of who can be sued under the ATS.
The majority in Doe VIII recognized that both the majority and
107
minority in Kiobel misread footnote twenty of Sosa.
The Doe VIII
majority maintains that all private actors—both persons and
108
The
corporations—are treated the same for purposes of the ATS.
Doe VIII majority held that the purpose of footnote twenty is to
question the distinction between all private actors and public actors,
109
not between private actors.
As a result, the court must look to
100

Id.
Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 41.
106
Id. at 49.
107
See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 50–52.
108
Id. at 49.
109
Id. at 51.
If the violated norm is one that international law applies only against states, then “a
private actor [] such as a corporations or an individual,” who acts independently of a
State can have no liability for a violation of the law of nations because there has been
no violation of the law of nations. On the other hand, if the conduct is of the type
classified as a violation of the norms of international law regardless of whether done
by a State or private actor, then “a private [] such as a corporation or an individual,” has
violated the law of nations and is subject to liability in a suit under the ATS.
Id. (citing Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 166 (Leval, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)).
101
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domestic law to determine which private actors can be sued.
Having dispensed with the choice-of-law question, the issue of
whether domestic law recognizes corporate liability was an easy one
110
for the D.C. Circuit to address. According to that court, corporate
111
liability has been recognized in the United States for centuries. In
addition, the D.C. Circuit found that even the Founders had a
conception of corporate liability at the time that Congress enacted
112
the ATS.
As a result, it held that corporations are not immune
from liability under the ATS and can be held liable for violations of
113
customary international law giving rise to a specific cause of action.
Finally, the court found that even assuming, arguendo, that
international law governs, Exxon Mobil is still liable because
114
international law recognizes corporate civil liability.
The Kiobel
court’s examples of the absence of corporate liability in international
law are misplaced because all of those examples deal exclusively with
115
criminal liability, not civil liability.
Indeed, history provides
persuasive support for the proposition that corporations can be held
116
civilly liable.
The majority in Doe VIII states that Kiobel’s focus on
the Nuremberg Trials and the Tribunal’s dismissal of I.G. Farben
Corporation is also misplaced because that decision had less to do
with whether international law recognizes corporate liability than
with the specific circumstances of post-war Germany’s economic
117
situation. As a result, the majority stated that even if international
law governs the corporate liability inquiry, there are ample sources of
118
international law that recognize corporate liability.
110

Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 47.
Id.
112
Id. In arguing that corporate liability has been recognized for centuries,
international law scholars cite to the suit against the East India Company in the late
seventeenth century in which the Company was sued for “its agent’s torts in violation
of the law of nations.” Brief for Professors of Legal History William R. Casto, et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners’ Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., cert. granted, No. 10-1491, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct. 17, 2011),
available
at
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutchpetroleum/.
113
Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 57.
114
Id. at 51–52.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
See id. at 57–64. The D.C. Circuit also addressed a number of other important
issues in its opinion in Doe VIII, including extraterritoriality, the interplay between
the ATS and TVPA and the appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and abetting
liability. Id. at 20–28, 57–64.
111
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C. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in Doe VIII is important because it
provides the basis for the argument that corporations cannot be sued
under the ATS, which is similar to the reasoning that the Second
119
Circuit used in Kiobel. First, Judge Kavanaugh would have held that
under the presumption against extraterritoriality, the ATS does not
apply to torts committed in foreign countries, but rather only to
120
actions by aliens for conduct that occurred inside the United States.
Second, Judge Kavanaugh would have applied customary
international law and determined that corporate liability does not
121
exist under recognized international law. Third, Judge Kavanaugh
would have barred corporate liability because of its inconsistency with
the TVPA, which provides that an action may only be sustained
122
against “persons.”
Finally, Judge Kavanaugh would have applied
the political question doctrine and consequently found that it was
contrary to U.S. foreign policy to hold corporations liable under the
123
ATS.
While the reasons set forth by Judge Kavanaugh do make
some sense, they are contrary to U.S. law, ATS jurisprudence, and
124
public policy.
IV. CORPORATIONS SHOULD BE LIABLE UNDER THE ATS: WHY THE D.C.
CIRCUIT CORRECTLY DECIDED DOE VIII
The majority in Doe VIII correctly held that corporations can be
liable under the ATS. In so holding, the court properly applied
domestic law rather than international law to address the question of
who can be sued when jurisdiction is obtained by the ATS. There are
seven reasons why Doe VIII was correctly decided. First, Sosa’s
footnote twenty and other ATS jurisprudence require courts to look
125
at domestic law, not international law.
In other words,
international law provides only the cause of action and its elements
while other questions related to deciding the case, such as
jurisdictional issues, are left to domestic law. Second, holding that
individuals—but not corporations—can be liable under the ATS is

119
120
121
122
123
124
125

See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 81–85.
Id. at 72 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 73.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.A.
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126

major conceptual flaw.
Third, holding corporations liable is
127
consistent with the purpose of the ATS. Fourth, the implications of
128
Fifth, it does
a contrary holding are squarely U.S. against policy.
not make sense to look at international law to determine who can be
a defendant because international law does not provide rules for
129
decision-making.
Sixth, the Doe VIII court was also correct in
holding that, even assuming international law governs, corporations
130
would still be liable.
Finally, corporate liability under the ATS is
consistent with international human-rights norms and principles of
131
corporate responsibility.
A. Sosa Requires Courts to Look at Domestic Law
The Doe VIII majority was correct that the ATS itself and footnote
twenty of Sosa require courts to look not at international law but at
federal law to determine whether corporations can be sued under the
ATS. The text of the ATS does not limit who can be a defendant, but
132
rather, only who can be a plaintiff. The Supreme Court endorsed
this understanding of the ATS in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., where it recognized that “[t]he [ATS] by its terms does
133
not distinguish among classes of defendants . . . .”
Thus, Congress
in no way expressly limited the class of defendants to which the
134
From a statutory construction standpoint,
Statute could extend.
there is no reason to believe that Congress intended the ATS to limit
135
a class of defendants.
126

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
128
See infra Part IV.D.
129
See infra Part IV.E.
130
See infra Part IV.F.
131
See infra Part IV.G.
132
28 U.S.C § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction in
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”); see Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654
F.3d 11, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th
Cir. 2008).
133
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438
(1989).
134
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Shell (No. 10-1491), at 22, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/.
135
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Ress. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984). Even assuming that Congress did not expressly answer the questions of
who can be a defendant, the Supreme Court requires only that a construction of the
statute be “permissible.” Id.
127
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Furthermore, Doe VIII is correct in pointing out that corporate
liability is consistent with footnote twenty of Sosa—the only guidance
136
from the Supreme Court on the scope of the ATS.
The Kiobel
majority misconstrued and misunderstood footnote twenty by
assuming that the footnote requires both the violation and the
violator of a customary international law norm to be recognized by
137
international law. Footnote twenty stands for the proposition—and
supports the common understanding—that some parts of
international law apply only to states, and thus plaintiffs can assert
138
these claims only against the states themselves.
Thus, footnote
twenty rightly concludes that once a court determines that a claim is
cognizable under international law, the court must then determine
whether that claim can be applied to states or private actors by
139
looking to international law.
International law answers the
question of what norms apply to states, and what norms apply to
everyone else. The Sosa Court was discussing whether international
law permits only states to be sued or whether private actors could also
be sued, not whether international law governs an inquiry into which
140
private actors could be sued.
Moreover, the footnote makes no
136

Brief for the United States, supra note 134, at 18 (arguing that “the court of
appeals misread footnote 20 to require not just an international consensus regarding
the content of an international-law norm, but also an international consensus on
how to enforce a violation of that norm.”).
137
See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41; David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of
CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute and the
Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334, 364
(2011).
138
See Brief for the United States, supra note 134, at 17 (“From Sosa’s footnote 20,
it is clear that ‘if the defendant is a private actor,’ . . . a court must consider whether
private actors are capable of violating the international-law norm at issue. . . . The
distinction between norms that apply only to state actors and norms that also apply to
non-state actors is well established in customary international law.”) (internal
citations omitted); see also STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 3–
4 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining that “[t]he law is no stranger to the idea of holding
individuals responsible for egregious conduct toward their fellow human beings”).
139
This was Kadic’s proposition. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir.
2005).
140
Brief for Petitioner, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum
Co.,
132
S.
Ct.
472
(2011),
at
20,
available
at
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/.
It is wrong to suggest that footnote 20 supplies the answer to any issue
other than the specific issue this Court was actually addressing. This is
especially so given this Court’s clear decision in Sosa that the ATS
provides subject matter jurisdiction for federal common law causes of
action for certain universally condemned international human rights
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distinction between private actors that are individuals and private
actors that are corporations, nor does it suggest that the two should
141
There is absolutely no distinction between
be treated differently.
corporations and private persons: all private actors are treated the
same. Looking to international law for the cause of action is one
thing, but determining who is liable for that cause of action is an
entirely different question. The former is governed by the ATS’s
142
requirement to look to international law; the latter is not.
Footnote twenty can be read in still another way: it could simply
pose the question of “whether international law extends the scope of
liability” to corporations, or whether some other law achieves that
143
function. Under this reading, the Court simply poses a question for
lower courts to address: which law should govern the question of
whether corporations can be sued? Thus, the text of the Sosa opinion
and footnote twenty indicate that courts may to look to domestic law
144
to determine whether corporations can be sued under the ATS.
B. Holding Individuals but not Corporations Liable Under the ATS is
a Major Conceptual Flaw
145

No court disputes that private actors are subject to liability.
Because corporations are defined as having a corporate personhood,
146
they should not be treated any differently from private individuals.
In Kadic, the Second Circuit held that international law does not
confine the reach of the ATS to states and instead expands that reach
147
to private persons. As the Kadic court states, domestic law is a more
148
proper source than international law to answer this question.
violations.
Id. at 32.
141
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 552 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
142
See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41; Scheffer, supra note 137. Contra Kiobel, 621 F.3d at
126.
143
See Scheffer supra note 137.
144
It should also be noted that footnote twenty of Sosa is only that: a footnote.
The footnote is only dicta, and courts should take care in not placing too much stock
in a few words buried within it, especially if its effect is to immunize a large group of
potential defendants. See Ben. Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 17 (2003) (stating
that “[d]icta of course have no precedential value . . . even when they do not
contradict . . . prior holdings of the Court”).
145
See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 2005) (disagreeing with the
previously held proposition by some courts that “the law of nations, as understood in
the modern era, confines its reach to state action.”).
146
See Scheffer, supra note 137.
147
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
148
See infra Part IV.A.
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Under American law, corporations are treated as individuals and are
149
Indeed, most
thus held liable, as would any other natural person.
recently in Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court held that both
150
corporations and natural persons are legal persons. In essence, the
Supreme Court set forth a conception of corporate personhood
permitting corporations to donate money to political campaigns just
151
as individuals do.
Thus, if we recognize—indeed agree—that
private individuals can be held liable for violations of the law of
nations under the ATS and that, according to Citizens United,
corporations are to be treated as individuals, then it seems to follow
152
that corporations should be liable under the ATS.
The Supreme
Court should be consistent in its application of corporate
personhood outlined in Citizens United and hold that corporations
can be sued under the ATS.
C. Holding Corporations Liable is Consistent with the Purpose of the
ATS.
Courts should recognize corporate liability under the ATS
because it was a principle of both U.S. (domestic) and international
law at the time Congress passed the ATS and because corporate
liability furthers the original purpose of the ATS. When Congress
passed the ATS, corporate liability was well-established and
recognized not only in the United States but also internationally—
153
especially in British common law. Specifically, corporations such as
the East India Company were sued and found liable for the actions of
154
their agents in international law disputes.
Furthermore, ship
commanders sailing on the high seas were held liable for the acts of
155
With the emergence of such principles, the United
their sailors.
149

See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010).
Id.
151
Id.
152
See generally Cheryl Holzmeyer, Human Rights in an Era of Neoliberal
Globalization: The Alien Tort Claims Act and Grassroots Mobilization in Doe v. Unocal, 43
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 271 (2009).
153
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 654 F.3d 11, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that
“[t]he notion that corporations could be held liable for their torts, therefore, would
not have been surprising to the First Congress that enacted the ATS”); see Hotchkis v.
Royal Bank of Scot., (1797) 2 Eng. Rep. 1202, 1203 (H.L.).
154
Brief for Professors of Legal History, supra note 112, at 16; see Moodalay v. The
E. India Co., (1785) 28 Eng. Rep. 1245, 1246 (Ch.) (stating that “[a]t the outset I
thought the cases of a corporation and of an individual were different; but I am glad
to have the authority of Lord Talbot, that they are not.”).
155
Brief for Professors of Legal History, supra note 112, at 23; see, e.g., The Malek
150
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States’s domestic common law adopted corporate liability.
These
examples demonstrate that corporate liability and agency law were
defined principles of domestic and international law when Congress
passed the ATS. Because corporate liability existed, the Founders
decided not to explicitly exempt corporations from liability—
157
otherwise they would certainly have done so in the statute. Thus, it
is well within the scope of the original statutory purpose to hold
158
corporations liable under the ATS.
Furthermore, corporate liability promotes the original purpose
of the ATS, “to forestall the appearance of American complicity in
159
violations of the law of nations.”
Thus, Congress developed the
160
ATS to give the United States legitimacy in the international realm.
The ATS provided a means to show the world that the United States
could deal effectively with international issues. Today, the ATS can
and should be a mechanism through which the United States
demonstrates that it will not be complicit in violations of the law of
161
Holding
nations—namely, human-rights abuses by corporations.
corporations liable under the ATS is thus consistent with the original
purpose of the ATS.
D. The Implications of a Contrary Holding are Squarely Against
Public Policy.
In Sosa, the Supreme Court mandated that courts look to public
162
policy when considering the scope of the ATS.
When examining
public policy, the Supreme Court’s decision counsels in favor of
examining both the negative and positive consequences of
163
recognizing a claim.
In terms of corporate liability, it is clear that
the positive consequences of allowing corporations to be sued under
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233–34 (1844); The Mariana Flora 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.)
1, 40–41 (1826).
156
Brief for Professors of Legal History, supra note 112, at 29–31.
157
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 140, at 29.
158
Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 48.
159
Brief for Professors of Legal History, supra note 112.
160
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716–17 (2004).
161
Compare Brief for Petitioner, supra note 140, at 28, with Brief for Respondent,
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., cert. granted,
2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522.
162
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33 (“[T]he determination whether a norm is sufficiently
definite to support a cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an
element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause
available to litigants in federal courts.”).
163
Id.
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the ATS outweigh the negative consequences of holding corporations
liable.
Holding that corporations can be liable for violations of the law
164
of nations is different than holding that corporations will be liable.
Allowing plaintiffs to sue corporations under the ATS simply allows
plaintiffs to bring the suit—it does not make corporations
automatically liable. A corporation will only be required to pay
damages if a court finds that it violated international law, which is by
no means guaranteed. The law should not permit corporations to get
away with violations of international law simply because they choose
165
to form a corporation.
In fact, one of the primary purposes of
forming a corporation is to avoid individual liability in favor of entity
liability. The law should not limit liability for the sole reason that
corporations would prefer to not pay damage awards. The United
States should not limit liability for a wrong simply because the alleged
wrongdoers—corporations, or any party for that matter—do not like
the possibility that they will be hailed into court. Wrongful conduct is
wrong regardless of the identity of the perpetrator. Addressing
wrongdoing is precisely the purpose of statutes such as the ATS. To
then retract that liability because it will be unfavorable for some of
the wrongdoers would defeat the entire purpose of the statute.
Holding that corporations can be sued under the ATS allows
166
domestic law to guide the behavior of corporations overseas.
Congress has expressly allowed for such extraterritorial control over
167
U.S. citizens abroad. This oversight is desirable because absent the
extension of U.S. law to corporate entities abroad, corporations
would be able to get away with human-rights abuses that were either
unenforced or unrecognized under the laws of the country in which
168
the corporations were operating.
Barring ATS litigation,
corporations would be left only to the laws of the nations in which
164

Infra Part IV.
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 149–50 (2d Cir.
2010) (Leval, J., concurring) (stating that according to the majority-created rule “one
who earns profits by commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights
can successfully shield those profits from victim’s claims for compensation simply by
taking the precaution of conducting the heinous operations in the corporate form”);
Khulumani v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 504 F.3d 254, 289 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J.,
concurring).
166
See Holzmeyer, supra note 152.
167
Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Congress in
prescribing standards of conduct for American citizens may protect the impact of its
laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States . . . .”).
168
See Holzmeyer, supra note 152.
165
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169

they operate.
The courts of these nations are oftentimes
170
susceptible to corruption and inaccessible to ordinary individuals.
Simply stated, just because a corporation must transact business does
not mean that it has a “license to assist in violations of international
171
law.” It is illogical to allow corporations to receive special treatment
simply because they are corporations, and prevent them from
answering to offenses that they or their agents commit abroad.
While some scholars argue that the individual managers of a
corporation would still be liable even absent recognition of corporate
172
liability under the ATS, this argument is misdirected.
In reality,
liability of the corporations themselves is a more effective deterrent
because “corporate agents are judgment-proof and cannot bear the
costs of sanctions, and because corporate liability encourages
173
shareholders to monitor corporate activities.”
Disallowing
corporate liability is contrary to established U.S. agency law, which
allows entities to be held liable for the acts of their agents. The
174
purpose of damages in a tort is to make the plaintiff whole.
Holding only managers liable under the ATS for decisions the entity
makes as a whole would permit corporations to evade responsibility
and would prevent the application of agency law—a reason for
175
forming corporations in the first place.
Courts should afford
plaintiffs complete redressability in their claims, and plaintiffs should
be allowed to seek that redress from the entity that harmed them.
Under U.S. agency principles, plaintiffs may sue those individuals or
entities that can best compensate the plaintiff in order to make him
or her whole. Plaintiffs under the ATS should be afforded the same
opportunity.
Preventing corporations from being sued under the ATS is
inconsistent with modern conceptions of justice. First, a rule that
corporations cannot be sued under the ATS would be categorical,
therefore applying to all ATS cases in which a corporation is a
169

See id.
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 289 (Hall, J., concurring).
171
Id.
172
See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120; see also Janine Stanisz, The Expansion of Limited
Liability Protection in the Corporate Form: The Aftermath of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 573, 598 (2011); Thompson, supra
note 42.
173
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility,
111 YALE L.J. 443, 473 (2001).
174
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).
175
See generally Stanisz, supra note 172, at 598.
170
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176

potential defendant.
Such a rule would prevent any corporation
from ever being sued under the ATS. A categorical rule that
disallows a suit completely is unfounded. It essentially allows
corporations to commit human-rights abuses or ignore potential
abuses because they are immunized from liability in the United
177
Natural persons who commit human-rights abuses are
States.
subject to liability, while corporations, composed of natural persons
shielded by the corporate structure, are not. This reality produces an
inequitable result, as among ATS defendants. Second, holding that
corporations cannot be sued is inconsistent with domestic and
international norms that require courts to provide plaintiffs with a
178
meaningful remedy.
Preventing corporations from being sued
under the ATS effectively limits a plaintiff’s ability to obtain redress
for his or her injuries. Thus, plaintiffs would only be able to obtain a
judgment against an individual, which in turn would likely
179
substantially reduce or inhibit a damages award.
Holding that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS is also
inconsistent with current jurisprudence because it is inconsistent with
180
Filartiga.
In determining that corporations cannot be sued under
the ATS, the Kiobel court explained that for liability to attach to an
ATS claim, there must be a violation of international law that is
181
universally recognized.
This is a misunderstanding of ATS
jurisprudence. If courts must look to universal international law as
Kiobel states, then ATS plaintiffs would always have to demonstrate
that the defendants would be universally held liable under
182
international law.
Thus, the Filartiga plaintiffs would have had to
176

Brief for the United States, supra note 134, at 14.
Of course, a corporation may be liable for human-rights abuses in the states in
which they occur. Many of these states, however, are severely lax in enforcing
human-rights norms; some states do not even have legal systems that recognize such
rights.
178
Cf. Brief for the United States, supra note 134, at 24.
179
See Ratner, supra note 173, at 473.
180
See generally Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
181
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010).
182
Brief for International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 15, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell (No. 10-1491), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_
preview/briefs/10-1491_petitioner_amcu_law_scholars.authcheckdam.pdf; see Brief
for Navi Pillay, The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners (No. 10-1491), at 6, available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/
(“[T]he proposition that corporations are not accountable for violations of
international human rights law ignores a fundamental principle of international law:
177
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“demonstrate that torturers were universally held civilly liable in the
183
This threshold is too high and
courts of [all] third countries.”
would alter years of ATS jurisprudence. It is inconsistent with the
development of current domestic and international law and would
184
essentially render hundreds of previous decisions bad law.
The
much more reasoned approach to analyzing corporate liability under
the ATS is found in domestic, not international law.
There is a strong policy rationale for clearly defining the
185
standard for corporate liability under the ATS.
Currently,
186
corporations are held to different standards in different circuits.
Accordingly, the lack of clarity “has thrown the circuit[s] into
187
disarray.”
Clearly defining the standard of liability would put
corporations, individuals, and foreign nations on notice of the
expectations and responsibilities of corporations engaging in activity
abroad. Absent a universal norm, there is too much uncertainty on
188
the part of both corporations and plaintiffs seeking to bring claims.
In addition, a clear definition would eliminate confusion and
ambiguities on the standard, and therefore allow corporations a
degree of comfort in knowing precisely what is expected of them and
189
to what extent they can be held liable.
If corporate liability is
recognized across the board, corporations and plaintiffs can move
forward in addressing the necessary issues. Thus, the Supreme Court
should address the issue and in doing so should clearly outline that
190
corporations can be sued under the ATS.
the principle that victims of human rights violations are entitled to an effective
remedy.”).
183
Brief for The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra
note 182, at 15.
184
Circuit decisions permitting corporate liability under the ATS that would be
overturned by such a Supreme Court case include Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
654 F.3d 11 and Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).
185
Telephone Interview with Alka Pradhan, Counsel, The Constitution Project
(Oct. 20, 2011) (on file with author).
186
Compare Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
with Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
187
Mark Hamblett, Circuit Rejects Corporate Alien Tort Law Liability, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
20, 2010.
188
Telephone Interview with Alka Pradhan, supra note 185.
189
Karen M. Borg & Merkys I. Gómez, Alien Tort Statute: Should We Be Concerned?,
COUNSEL
2
(Aug.
2007),
available
at
CORPORATE
http://butlerrubin.com/web/br.nsf/0/CF4E3FBB296096518625732A005AE4CA/$F
ILE/W0052343.PDF.
190
Telephone Interview with Alka Pradhan, supra note 185; contra Michael
Garvey, Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Legislative
Prerogative, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 381, 396 (arguing that the legislature is best
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E. International Law Does Not Provide Rules of Decision-Making and
Thus Courts Must Look to Domestic Law
Conceptually, it makes sense to look to domestic federal law to
determine whether corporations can be held liable for a violation of
the law of nations because domestic law provides rules of decisionmaking. Sosa was consistent with the proposition that “the cause of
action in ATS cases is based on federal common law and that
international law leaves the means by which international law
obligations are to be implemented within States to each domestic
191
legal system.”
International law allows nations to decide for
192
themselves how they will implement international law norms. The
idea that courts should look to domestic law to determine the claims
recognizable under the ATS for the scope of those claims is
193
consistent with international law. Indeed, international law requires
courts applying international law to look to domestic law for
194
procedural and decision-making rules. In other words, the ATS is a
grant of jurisdiction in federal courts to aliens bringing a claim of a
195
violation of the law of nations.
The law of nations formally
indicates the wrongs that the community of nations recognizes, and
the ATS makes those wrongs actionable in U.S. courts—it should not
196
matter whether a corporation or an individual commits that wrong.
Thus, looking to domestic law to determine who can be sued allows
those who have been injured by corporations the recourse they would
receive had the injury been committed by an individual.
equipped to answer the question of corporate liability). To the contrary, courts are
well-equipped to answer these questions and indeed should answer the questions,
especially when they have posed the questions.
191
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 140, at 23.
192
The Lotus Case, 1927 P.I.C.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 1927); see Brief for
International Law Scholars, supra note 182, at 5.
193
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 152, 183–84 (2d Cir.
2010) (Leval, J., concurring); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 770,
778 (2d Cir. 1980) (Edwards, J., concurring); Brief for Professors of Legal History,
supra note 112, at 3 (stating “[a] historical understanding of the legal system
demonstrates that the norms that defined prohibited conduct under the ATS were
drawn from the law of nations while enforcement questions, such as which particular
defendant would be assessed damages, were drawn from the domestic common
law”).
194
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 140, at 34 (stating that “[t]he drafters of the
ATS understood that the rules of decision in ATS cases would be found in common
law”); see The Lotus Case, 1927 P.I.C.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 28; see Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 730–31 (2004); Brief for International Law Scholars, supra
note 182, at 5.
195
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (citing historical proof).
196
See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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In addition, international law does not provide rules with
sufficient clarity for determining all aspects of a violation of
197
international law.
While the claim itself may be universally and
specifically recognized as a violation of international law, the other
rules involving such a claim—such as its scope and limits—may not
be recognized with the same specificity and universality. This reality
does not mean that all claims arising under international law lack
sufficient definiteness—it simply means that courts must look
198
elsewhere to determine the contours of its scope.
U.S. law
adequately—in fact, exceptionally—determines the scope of claims
199
that international law recognizes.
International law does not have
the standards and procedural mechanisms necessary to guide such a
200
decision.
To determine what claims are recognized by the law of nations,
and what the elements of those claims are, we must look to
201
international law. There, the inquiry under international law ends,
and courts should return to domestic law to determine the rest of the
202
case.
Doe VIII illustrates this proposition by noting that courts do
203
not conceptualize a separate claim for “corporate battery.” Instead,
the claim is always simply battery, and who pays damages is left to
204
common law agency principles. In other words, the question in this
hypothetical and in the ATS choice-of-law question is, more
205
appropriately, “who must pay damages?”
197

See Michael Barsa & David Dana, Three Obstacles of the Promotion of Corporate
Social Responsibility by Means of the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Sosa Court’s Incoherent
Conception of the Law of Nations, the “Purposive” Action Requirement for Aiding and
Abetting, and the State Action Requirement for Primary Liability, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 79, 99–100 (2010) (arguing that “while the Supreme Court in Sosa
acknowledged that customary international law might evolve over time, it tried to
anchor that evolution in a false sense of the ‘certainty’ of the ‘law of nations’ as it
had been recognized under the eighteenth century natural law tradition. Contrary
to the Court’s assumption, the ‘law of nations’ was meant to be somewhat fluid and
evolving from the very beginning.”) (internal citations omitted).
198
Cf. Barsa & Dana, supra note 197, at 90–91.
199
Cf. Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 43.
200
See Id.
201
Id. at 41.
202
Other aspects of the case include procedural determinations and elements
that international law cannot provide, such as who is a defendant. These domestic
law determinations should not be inconsistent with international law.
203
Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 41.
204
See id.
205
Id. at 41; see Brief for Professors of Legal History, supra note 112 (“Courts
historically used domestic law to address questions of allocating losses to juridical
entities for violations of the law of nations.”).
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Thus, while there must be a violation of the law of nations to
trigger the ATS and provide subject matter jurisdiction over the case,
the federal common law supplies the rules “governing the scope of
206
tort remedies and other rules governing ATS litigation.”
Furthermore, it makes sense to apply federal domestic law to the
inquiry because courts already look to federal law in such cases for
207
procedural rules of decision-making.
By its express language, the
ATS limits who can be a plaintiff and lets federal law—not
international law—determine who can be a defendant by way of the
208
limits of the rules of personal jurisdiction.
F.

Even Under International Law, Corporations may Still be Liable

Despite the fact that Sosa and policy principles mandate that
courts look to domestic rather than customary international law to
determine the scope of liability for corporations under the ATS,
209
international law positively recognizes corporate liability.
First,
customary international law recognizes juridical liability for entities
210
such as corporations.
The International Court of Justice
adjudicated a case involving a company, and thus implicitly
211
acknowledged that corporations can be sued.
In addition, the
International Court of Justice held that an international organization
212
If juridical entities such as international
can sue a state.
organizations can bring a claim, then it seems fair for juridical
213
entities like corporations to be sued as well.
Second, general
206

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 140, at 34; see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 724 (2004).
207
See generally Philip A. Scarborough, Rules of Decision for Issues Arising Under the
Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (2007).
208
See generally id.
209
See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 53.
210
See generally Harmony v. United States (The Malek Adhel), 43 U.S. (2 How.)
210, 233–34 (1844); The Mariana Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40–41 (1826);
Moodalay v. The E. India Co., (1785) 28 Eng. Rep. 1245, 1246 (Ch.). Maritime law, a
part of international law, recognizes liability for juridical entities such as ships. Brief
for International Law Scholars, supra note 182, at 27. Today, “it is not uncommon
for the human rights responsibilities of multinational corporations to be addressed
and applied by intergovernmental organizations.” Id.
211
See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 38–39 (Feb. 5).
“Corporate personhood has been recognized by the ICJ upon considering the
‘wealth of practice already accumulated on the subject in municipal law.’” Doe VIII,
654 F.3d at 53 (quoting Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. at 38–39).
212
See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179–80 (Apr. 11).
213
The International Court of Justice recognized that the United Nations had a
right to bring a claim against a state because of its uniquely international function
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214

principles of law—a source of international law —recognize
215
All legal systems of the world, including the
corporate liability.
216
In fact, suits against
United States, recognize corporate liability.
corporations are “both commonplace and regularly exercised,
including for conduct that occurs outside the home jurisdiction of a
217
corporation.”
Thus, general principles of law recognize that
corporations can be sued. Third, treaties require the United States to
218
uphold human rights.
Thus, international law requires that the
United States implement laws and policies in accordance with human
219
rights. The ATS is one such law, and to be compliant with treaties,
it must recognize corporate liability to protect human rights.
Furthermore, the ATS’s grant of jurisdiction over corporations
operating in foreign countries is consistent with jurisdictional
principles in international law. International law recognizes that
states may obtain jurisdiction over defendants in a number of ways
220
without the defendant being present within that state.
According
to the passive personality principle, states may obtain jurisdiction over
221
defendants when those defendants harm nationals of the state.
Similarly, the protective principle recognizes jurisdiction over
222
defendants who infringe on an important state interest. Finally, the
universal jurisdiction principle recognizes that jurisdiction is proper
in some certain instances where the right infringed is universal in
223
nature.
The ATS most properly fits within the protective
224
principle.
If the United States asserts that human rights and
foreign relations are important state interests, corporations clearly
damage these important state interests when they fail to abide by

and because it should have a right to remedy a wrong. See id. at 184–85. Similarly,
corporations have a unique international function and character that supersedes
national boundaries, much like the United Nations. Thus, plaintiffs, like the United
Nations, should be able to redress their injuries.
214
See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 56–61 (2006).
215
Brief for International Law Scholars, supra note 182, at 22.
216
Brief for International Law Scholars in Support of the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., cert. granted, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522,
at 16.
217
Id. at 18.
218
Id. at 17.
219
See id.
220
See MCCAFFREY, supra note 214, at 179–88.
221
See id. at 188–89.
222
See id. at 182–84.
223
See id. at 184–88.
224
Cf. id. at 188–89.
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human-rights norms.
Finally, the Kiobel court erroneously determined that
international law does not recognize corporate liability based solely
225
on looking to criminal, not civil, tribunals.
In the context of the
226
Indeed, there is an
ATS, courts should look to civil liability.
enormous difference between criminal liability and civil liability, and
the legal reasoning for applying one cannot necessarily apply in the
227
context of the other.
Courts and scholars have rejected criminal
liability of corporations in part because civil liability provides the
most effective punishment for corporations—monetary damages—
while other punishments—such as imprisonment—are more suitable
228
for individuals in the criminal context.
The Second Circuit erred when it looked to The Nuremberg Trials
for direction on the issue of whether international law recognizes
229
corporate liability.
In Kiobel, the Second Circuit examined the
Nuremberg Court’s dismissal of claims against I.G. Farben, a
corporate entity that was sued for complicity in the Holocaust, as
evidence that international law prohibits corporations from being
230
231
sued. Furthermore, the Nuremberg court was a criminal tribunal.
232
International law does not recognize corporate criminal liability.
Thus, the Nuremberg court did not have jurisdiction over the claims
against the company for criminal violations. Despite the fact that the
Nuremberg court did not exercise jurisdiction over corporations, it

225

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 170 (Leval, J., concurring only
in the judgment).
226
See id.
227
Id.
Whereas criminal liability of corporations is unknown in much of the
world, civil liability of corporations is enforced throughout the world.
Whereas the imposition of criminal punishment on corporations fails
to achieve the objective of criminal punishment, the compensatory
purposes of civil liability are perfectly served when it is imposed on
corporations. Whereas criminal prosecution of a corporation could
misdirect prosecutorial attention away from the responsible persons
who deserve punishment, imposition of civil compensatory liability on
corporations makes possible the achievement of the goal of civil law to
compensate victims for the abuses they have suffered.
Id.
228
Id.
229
Contra id. at 132–33.
230
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 170 (Leval, J., concurring in the judgment).
231
See id. (majority opinion) at 155.
232
Brief for The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra
note 182, at 23.
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made clear that corporations could be held liable.
Thus, general
principles of international law and legal history suggest that
corporations can be used under international law.
G. Corporations Must Uphold Human Rights
The time is ripe for ensuring that human-rights standards are
addressed globally. As corporations continue to invest in developing
countries, the United States must perfect its stance on human-rights
234
abuses in accordance with internationally accepted norms.
First, corporations have a moral duty to abide by human rights,
235
as do all other individuals. If corporations are owed the same rights
236
and protections as people, they should owe moral duties to other
237
people.
Like any individual, a corporation should be responsible
238
It must not kill, injure, or repress. Corporations
for its conduct.
should not be amoral. As an integral part of society, corporations
must abide by society’s moral measures. Indeed, at least one scholar
has suggested that corporations should have a higher moral
239
responsibility than individuals because they affect more people.
The law reflects our conceptions and standards of morality.
Corporations are not immune from these moral compasses. Holding
corporations liable for human-rights abuses under the ATS is an
important step in solidifying and enforcing corporate morality, just
like individual morality is codified and enforced.
Corporate liability under the ATS is also consistent with recent
240
trends in international and global law. Holding corporations liable
under the ATS is necessary for the advancement and development of
241
human-rights norms throughout the world.
Modern international
law favors a determination that entities or individuals other than the

233

Id.
See Ratner, supra note 173, at 447.
235
See generally John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and
other business enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010).
236
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010).
237
Ratner, supra note 173, at 503–04 (“[F]or instance, by working form a moral
starting point that a corporation has a duty not to invest at all in a repressive society,
or a duty to ensure that it does not in any way benefit from the government’s lax
human rights policy.”).
238
See generally Ruggie, supra note 235.
239
Ratner, supra note 173, at 508.
240
See, e.g., id. at 475.
241
See Ruggie, supra note 235.
234
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states themselves owe human-rights duties to individuals.
To
advance this developing norm in the international realm, ATS
liability must extend to corporations. Corporations are an integral
part of the human-rights discussion, and to permit ATS suits against
them keeps them engaged in the discussion and the development of
human-rights norms and jurisprudence.
Furthermore, international law now recognizes non-state and
243
individual liability for human-rights abuses.
States are no longer
244
the only actors that violate individuals’ human rights. Entities and
245
The
natural persons can harm individuals just as much as states.
law should respond to this reality. To achieve this, the law should be
informed by the understanding that corporations, not states, may be
in the best position to advance human-rights norms globally. The
power of the nation-state is waning while the power of the
corporation is ever-increasing. Corporations are multi-national and
trans-national actors; they cross and transcend borders, laws, and
246
norms. Because some corporations are true supra-national entities,
they should be required to uphold and protect liberties and rights
that transcend national boundaries. Because they are in a farreaching position, corporations may in fact be best suited to bring
about real change to the way human-rights norms and law are
247
respected and upheld across the globe.
Critics argue that United States law should not mandate that
248
corporations be “conscripted philanthropists.”
One scholar,
Donald Kochan argues that while human-rights abuses are certainly
grave, the ATS is not the appropriate mechanism through which to
249
hold corporations accountable.
He says that all abuses need not
250
have specific remedies in American law. He further argues that it is
inappropriate for the government to affirmatively compel, “by
coercive force,” corporations to act in accordance with prescribed
242

Ratner, supra note 173.
Id. at 469.
244
Id. at 469 (arguing that “[t]he immense power of the state to cause harm to
human dignity was revealed as never before in World War II and thus justified the
continued concentration on rights of individuals against the state”).
245
See id. at 477–78.
246
See id. at 447–48.
247
See id. at 474.
248
Donald Kochan, Legal Mechanization of Corporate Social Responsibility Through
Alien Tort Statute Litigation: A Response to Professor Branson With Some Supplemental
Thoughts, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 251, 254 (2011).
249
See id. at 254–55.
250
See id. at 255.
243
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251

moral obligations.
These concerns are misplaced. Corporations
owe a duty to individuals they affect. The ATS is simply a grant of
jurisdiction, not a cause of action for breaches of that duty. It does
not provide any remedy. Rather, it serves as a way for plaintiffs to get
into U.S. courts with the possibility of holding corporations
accountable for alleged abuses of rights, much like they are held
accountable for abuses within the United States. If the United States
is serious about human rights, it should not permit corporations to
evade jurisdiction and liability for violating those rights.
V. THE REAL IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS:
THERE IS A WAY TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS
The legal question of whether foreign plaintiffs can sue
corporate defendants for violations of the law of nations under the
ATS has been hotly debated and litigated in recent years and is the
252
subject of a great scholarly divide. The Supreme Court will answer
this question in its discussion of the Second Circuit’s holding in
253
Kiobel, which the parties argued for the second time in late 2012.
Although courts and scholars have debated the liability issue
extensively, there has been little discussion of the real implications of
holding corporations liable under the ATS. Frequently, when
practitioners discuss corporate liability, they argue that public policy
considerations weigh for or against holding corporations liable under
254
the ATS, and the inquiry ends there.
They oftentimes make
255
projections that are unsubstantiated. Some of these projections are
quite severe and have created what amounts to nothing less than
256
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas
panic in the corporate world.
251

Id. at 254.
See supra Part IV.
253
See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.
2010), cert. granted, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 7522 (Oct. 17, 2011).
254
See, e.g., John B. Henry, Fortune 500: The Total of Litigation Estimated at 1/3
Profits,
THE
MET.
CORP.
COUNSEL
(Feb.
1,
2008),
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2008/February/28.pdf; James E. Berger &
Charlene C. Sun, Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, PAUL HASTINGS,
September
2011,
available
at
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/2003.pdf?wt.mc_ID=2003.pdf
(failing to address the implications for corporations that may be subject to liability
under the ATS).
255
HUFBAUER, supra note 22, at 1.
256
Id. at 1 (stating that “[t]his one-sentence law . . . could plausibly culminate in a
nightmare, more than 200 years after it was enacted” and “corporate lawyers would
advise the targeted multinational corporations (MNCs) and many other firms to
curtail their investments, not only in China but also in other (mainly developing)
252
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K. Mitrokostas go so far as to say that
[u]nless checked by Congress or the Supreme Court, trial
lawyers will seek to expand the scope of ATS awards to such
an extent that investment and trade in developing countries
will be seriously threatened. The ultimate losers will be
millions of impoverished people denied an opportunity to
participate in global markets. Along the way, the United
States will find itself at loggerheads with traditional allies,
257
trading partners, and developing countries.
It is important to note that if corporations are not abusing
human rights abroad, they should not be worried about liability. This
section attempts to deconstruct those notions and evaluate the real
implications of holding corporations liable under the ATS. Overall,
the threat to corporations is likely not as serious and adverse as many
corporate leaders think, and in fact, corporate liability under the ATS
can produce positive effects for corporations, human rights, and
258
foreign relations.
A. Procedural and Practical Limits
As a preliminary matter, and as discussed above, it is important
to note that finding that corporations are subject to liability under
the ATS does not mean that they inevitably will be found liable under
the particular circumstances of a case. Allowing corporations to be
sued in ATS actions merely opens the door to liability—and
redressability—instead of closing it. Assuming corporations can be
sued under the ATS, there will still be many obstacles a plaintiff must
overcome in order to prove that a corporation is actually liable for a
violation of the law of nations.
The number of claims brought under the ATS will not increase
259
if the Supreme Court recognizes corporate liability.
According to
260
Sosa, courts cannot invent new causes of action under the ATS.
Instead, they must recognize claims under international customary
261
law as that law was perceived by the Founders.
Thus, the types of
countries with less than perfect observance of individual and labor rights and
shortcomings in the realm of political and environment norms”).
257
Id. at 2.
258
See infra Parts V.A–F.
259
Cf. Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally Sue Locally:
Trends and Out-of-Control Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
456, 461 (2011).
260
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004).
261
See id.
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claims that a plaintiff could potentially bring are inherently limited to
262
only those recognized by international law. This reality will severely
limit the number and scope of suits that plaintiffs can bring under
the ATS. Although the number of cases brought against corporate
defendants for violations of the law of nations may increase if courts
find that corporations can be sued, for all the reasons previously
stated, there are many factors that will hinder plaintiffs from bringing
263
these cases and ultimately prevailing. As of 2011, there have been
155 ATS cases filed against corporations, eighty percent of which
264
were filed in the past fifteen years.
On average, there are
approximately six to ten new ATS claims filed each year against
265
corporations. Given that most circuits now allow corporations to be
sued under the ATS, the number of suits will likely not increase
substantially, if at all, even if the Supreme Court explicitly recognizes
corporate liability. Corporate executives worry that if corporations
are held liable under the ATS, plaintiffs will be more inclined to file
266
frivolous lawsuits. In reality, however, ATS cases will still be difficult
267
Accordingly, extending liability to
to bring and to prove.
corporations in all circuits would not significantly increase the
268
number of claims plaintiffs bring against corporate defendants.
Plaintiffs will also face considerable procedural and logistical
bars to bringing and sustaining a claim against a corporate
269
defendant.
In fact, federal courts regularly dismiss ATS cases
270
before they actually reach trial.
As a result, few ATS claims
involving corporate defendants make it past the summary judgment
stage and almost none make it to trial, no less to the judgment
271
stage. Holding that corporations can be sued under the ATS does
not eliminate the procedural rules already in place for litigation in

262

See id.
See supra Part IV.
264
Drimmer et al., supra note 259, at 461.
265
Id. at 460.
266
Berger et al., supra note 254, at 5.
267
See Drimmer et al., supra note 259, at 460.
268
See id.
269
Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate
Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 981 (2004). It is nearly impossible to obtain
figures on the exact number of ATS cases filed and those that are dismissed or
settled before they reach trial.
270
Rosaleen T. O’Gara, Procedure Under the Alien Tort Statute, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 797,
798 (2011).
271
Stanisz, supra note 172, at 598–99.
263
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272

American courts.
First, in order to persist beyond summary
judgment or motions to dismiss, a court must have personal
273
This requirement,
jurisdiction over the corporate defendant.
present in all U.S. cases, may limit the number of claims because U.S.
courts do not always have personal jurisdiction over a corporate
274
defendant.
Second, a plaintiff claiming a violation of the law of
nations under the ATS against a corporate defendant will have to do
275
so within the applicable statute of limitations.
Courts can borrow
the statute of limitations from the TVPA, a similar state statute, or
276
international law.
In most cases, courts will apply the statute of
277
Thus, in some cases a
limitations from the TVPA to the ATS.
plaintiff’s claim will be dismissed simply because it was not—or could
not have been—brought within the applicable statute of limitations
period.
Third, a claim against a corporate defendant may be subject to
the requirement that a corporation act in complicity with a state
278
actor.
Some courts have not yet addressed whether corporations
279
can be liable absent any state action.
In many cases, whether
corporations can be held liable absent state action depends on the
280
nature of the underlying claim. Fourth, it is important to note that
many of the claims against corporate defendants will involve political
281
questions, which are non-justiciable in U.S. courts. Thus, corporate
272

See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
Cleveland, supra note 269, 981. It is important to note that the court must
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant in accordance with American law—not
international law: the procedural rules that govern U.S. courts do not disappear
simply because a plaintiff asserts a violation of international law.
274
See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–
03 (1989) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an
individual liberty interest. . . . Thus, the test for personal jurisdiction requires that
the maintenance of the suit . . . not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945))
(internal quotations omitted).
275
Cleveland, supra note 269, at 981. Again, note that the statute of limitations
for a violation of international law is decided by looking to domestic law, because
domestic law provides rules for decision-making. This reality further supports the
argument that domestic law should govern the question of whether corporations can
be sued under the ATS. See id.
276
BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATIONS IN U.S. COURTS 148 (1996).
277
Id. at 149.
278
Cleveland, supra note 269, at 976.
279
Id.
280
See id.
281
Id. at 981.
273
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defendants will still be able to argue in each particular case that the
282
judiciary is not the proper branch to address the plaintiff’s claim.
Instead, the defendant can argue that the Executive branch is more
properly equipped to handle matters of foreign law and international
283
affairs.
Fifth, some scholars have suggested that a heightened
pleading standard should apply to ATS cases involving corporations,
284
which would help to filter out frivolous cases.
Regardless of
whether a heightened standard applies, plaintiffs must still state a
claim that is plausible on its face, in accordance with the Supreme
285
Court’s directive in Twombly and Iqbal.
286
Finally, developing an ATS case is not easy. In some ATS cases,
the plaintiffs, their lawyers, and the defendants are in three entirely
different locations and as a result gathering information before the
287
plaintiffs file a suit can be prohibitively difficult. Discovery after the
complaint is filed is also challenging to obtain because of distance
and the different, and often hostile, evidentiary rules in foreign
288
countries. Proving an ATS case at trial oftentimes requires proof by
289
circumstantial evidence and expert testimony.
But even after a
judgment is entered, plaintiffs may run into difficulty in collecting
290
Many judgments in ATS cases have gone
their damage award.
291
uncollected. These procedural complications have the potential to
limit—perhaps even severely—a plaintiff’s claim under the ATS
against a corporate defendant.
These procedural bars are subject to the premise that the

282

See id.
STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 276, at 144 (“To the extent foreign law may
apply, the defendant may argue that the case should be dismissed to avoid becoming
entangled in the difficulties of foreign law.”).
284
See Geoffrey M. Sweeney, Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien
Tort Statute: A Proposal for Evaluating the Facial Plausibility of a Claim, 56 LOY. L. REV.
1037, 1066–67 (2010); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
285
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
286
See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 276, at 164.
287
See id. (“[B]asic information about the plaintiffs, the defendant and the claim
must be evaluated before deciding whether a lawsuit is legally justified and practically
feasible.”).
288
See id. at 182, 186 (“Defendants have many ways to frustrate discovery.”)
(“Obtaining evidence from abroad can be a complex and time-consuming process,
one that often results in clashes between U.S. and foreign authorities.”).
289
See id. at 200, 205.
290
See id. at 218.
291
See id.
283
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plaintiff’s action even gets to federal court. First, foreign plaintiffs
are not often in an ideal position to bring a claim against a corporate
293
The reality is that many of the
defendant in the United States.
potential plaintiffs in ATS actions are simply financially and
294
logistically unable to bring a claim. Sustaining an ATS claim against
a corporate defendant requires, first and foremost, knowledge of the
ATS and the potential recourse available to plaintiffs under the
295
statute.
Without such knowledge, plaintiffs would not know to
bring a claim in the first place. In addition, plaintiffs must have the
296
financial resources to bring and sustain a claim. While many nonprofits may be willing to aid in this regard, it will not be easy for
297
plaintiffs to get this financial support or provide it for themselves.
It is also important that, regardless of whether the plaintiffs are able
to obtain outside counsel or help from a non-governmental
organization (NGO), the costs of putting together a case, discovery,
and producing testimony from distant countries will often be
298
prohibitively high.
Second, before a plaintiff can enter a U.S. court, he or she must
have exhausted his or her remedies in his or her home state, and an
action in that state must not be preferable to an action in the United
299
States.
Plaintiffs will likely have difficulty sustaining and pursuing
claims against corporate defendants without pooling resources
300
To obtain class certification,
together as a class in a class action.
292

See O’Gara, supra note 270, at 798.
See id.
294
Id.
295
Id.
296
See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 276, at 161 (explaining that “[t]he fact that
damage awards are usually difficult to collect also makes it hard for private attorneys
to bring suits, since the work generally must be handled without fee”).
297
See id.
298
See O’Gara, supra note 270, at 808–09. While corporations often lament about
how much litigation costs them, it is important to keep in mind that plaintiffs must
also bear the burden of their legal expenses.
299
See Cleveland, supra note 269, at 981, 986 (noting that forum non conveniens
principles must still apply); see generally Piper v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981)
(discussing the private and public interest factors weighing in a determination of an
adequate alternative forum); see STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 276, at 146 (stating
that “[t]o prove that remedies in the country where the violations occurred need not
be exhausted, plaintiffs must submit evidence showing that pursuit of a human rights
claim would be futile, given the weakness of the local judiciary and its inability to
handle such cases”).
300
The requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 23 may not be met easily. Class
certification requires numerosity, common questions of law or fact, typicality, and
adequacy of representation. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. A recent discussion of some of the
293
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plaintiffs would have to prove that there are common questions of
law or fact, that the plaintiffs are too numerous for practical joinder,
that the class’s representative is adequate, and that the
301
representative’s claim is typical to the rest of the class members.
Finally, it must be noted that corporations, by virtue of their size
and power, possess enormous ability to effect change through
302
political and media tactics. Corporations often have the resources
and the far-reaching ability to affect public perception through
303
media outlets such as news, print, and the Internet.
Thus,
corporations cannot claim that liability under the ATS will destroy
their public image when they have the resources to potentially
304
control their own image in the media.
Essentially, that plaintiffs may sue corporate defendants does not
mean that procedural and logistical restraints disappear. Thus,
plaintiffs will still likely have a difficult time bringing and sustaining a
claim against a corporate defendant for a violation of the law of
nations.
B. Litigation Expenses
Skeptics believe that corporate liability under the ATS will have
305
detrimental effects on corporations.
Scholars have posited that
holding corporations liable will produce results that could, in
306
These arguments are severely
essence, ruin the U.S. economy.
misguided, misconceived, and far more dramatic than reality
suggests.
Corporate litigation expenses will not dramatically increase as a
result of allowing corporations to be sued under the ATS. There is
307
no doubt that corporate litigation expense is already high. In 2006,
profits from Fortune 500 companies totaled approximately $610
billion, of which corporations spent nearly $210 billion on
308
litigation.
Some scholars use this high figure as an argument for
elements of FED. R. CIV. P. 23 can be found in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011).
301
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
302
Drimmer et al., supra note 259, at, 460–61, 474–79.
303
Id. at 474–79.
304
Cf. id.
305
See, e.g., HUFBAUER, supra note 22, at 1–2.
306
Thompson, supra note 42, at 310–11.
307
Id.
308
Id. at 310–11; see Henry, supra note 254. Corporations spend an astronomical
amount of money on litigation. It is unclear, however, how the global financial crisis
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why corporations should not be held liable under the ATS. But the
data reflects all litigation expenses, even when the corporation itself
310
In
initiates the suit against an individual or another corporation.
addition, the data includes litigation expenses for valid claims in
311
violation of the law. Thus, while the data suggests that corporations
are victims of predatory lawsuits that drain a large proportion of their
total profits, the reality is that many of these suits are initiated by the
312
corporations themselves.
Some scholars project that allowing corporations to be sued will
result in an additional $200 billion in litigation costs if all claims
313
succeed.
Of course, not all claims will succeed. Furthermore, it
should be noted that while corporations must pay their corporate
counsel to defend against claims, plaintiffs must also bear the burden
of their legal expenses when they sue a corporation. There is simply
no data to suggest that holding corporations liable under the ATS
will significantly increase this already astronomically high number.
Finally, one author suggests that allowing corporate liability under
the ATS shifts the costs too easily to shareholders of U.S.
314
corporations. Potential liability under the ATS is a factor—just like
any other—that an investor should consider before investing in a
multi-national corporation. Corporate liability should not be limited
simply because its shareholders will have to bear the burden of that
liability.
C. Settlement Expenses
There are additional arguments that corporations will suffer
great loss at the hands of ATS liability. Commentators argue that
allowing corporations to be sued under the ATS will produce such
bad press for corporations that many will seek to settle cases
315
immediately.
In fact, some corporations have settled ATS cases
before the plaintiff files a complaint for fear that once a complaint is
filed, the press will be so negative that it would severely impact the
of 2008 changed the situation.
309
Drimmer, supra note 259, at 460–61.
310
See Henry, supra note 254.
311
Cf. id.
312
Cf. id.
313
Drimmer supra note 254, at 460–61; see generally Gary Hufbauer & Nicholas
Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 246
(2004).
314
Thompson, supra note 42, at 312.
315
Id. at 312.
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316

corporation.
According to these commentators, corporations may
settle cases—even unmeritorious cases—because, regardless of merit,
317
Thus, corporations may pay
it would cost more to try the case.
huge sums of money to plaintiffs who do not even have legitimate
cases, simply because those corporations are worried about the
318
financial and public relations consequences of going to trial. These
assumptions are also unfounded. Despite the fact that most circuits
319
recognize corporate liability, only six ATS cases are filed each year.
Because it is not likely that federal courts will be inundated with
corporate ATS cases, for the reasons discussed above, it is unlikely
that corporations will see a spike in settlement costs.
D. Investment Concerns
Similarly, opponents of corporate liability under the ATS argue
that corporate liability will severely hinder foreign investment and
320
will deter corporations from doing business in foreign countries. In
2003, Hufbauer and Mitrokostas hypothesized that ATS litigation
would prompt a “conservative” estimate of mass disinvestment in
321
developing countries to the tune of $55 billion.
Hufbauer and
Mitrokostas projected that this loss in foreign direct investment
would cause a loss of 380,000 jobs and would “depress overall U.S.
322
trade with target countries by 10 percent from current levels.” Nine
years have passed and this doomsday prophecy has not come to
fruition, despite the fact that most circuit courts today allow
corporations to be sued. To the contrary, corporate liability will
simply force companies to be more aware and attuned to humanrights abuses abroad and to steer clear of those abuses. There is
simply no evidence to suggest that corporations will limit investment
in foreign countries simply because they may be sued under the
323
ATS. Corporations take risks in order to make a profit. They will
316

Telephone Interview with Sander Bak, Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCoy, LLP (Oct. 26, 2011) (on file with author). It is important to note that there
is little reliable information on how much is spent by corporations in settling ATS
suits, partially because corporations settle these cases for the precise purpose of
keeping the facts out of public view and partially because the settlements that are
public do not yield much helpful information. Id.
317
Id.
318
See Drimmer, supra note 259, at 465.
319
Id. at 461.
320
Thompson, supra note 42, at 312.
321
HUFBAUER, supra note 22, at 40.
322
Id. at 42.
323
Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability
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realize that the economic advantages of investing and operating in a
324
foreign country outweigh the risk of being sued under the ATS.
Corporations engaged in activities in foreign nations will likely find
that doing business in that particular country is still financially
beneficial to the corporation because the benefits from doing
325
business there outweigh the risks of being sued.
Mere investment in an “authoritarian regime has never been
sufficient ground for liability under the ATS” and thus will not deter
326
companies from investing.
If corporations are not violating
customary international law, they should not have to expend large
sums of money in an effort to comply with such laws and norms. At
the same time, allowing corporations to be sued will, to the extent
that violations exist, create an incentive for corporations to
implement internal compliance structures within the corporation to
327
prevent and limit liability.
By doing so, corporations will not only
bolster compliance with human rights abroad, but will also ensure
that the corporation is a more sound and returnable investment for
investors back home.
Similarly, corporate constructive
engagement—the idea that democracy and human rights are best
transferred through the interaction between individuals and
corporations from the U.S. and foreign countries—will sweeten the
328
climate for investment.
Corporate adherence to international
norms will create a more responsible and safe investment
environment, while also increasing public relations internationally.
Some scholars argue that investment is better promoted by
corporations operating in these foreign countries and that in the
329
long run, this openness will promote human rights. This is a weak
argument for why corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS.
The point is not to discourage investment, but rather to encourage
Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207,
235 (2008) (“[N]either the Administration nor the business community has . . .
presented any empirical . . . evidence suggesting that corporations will decline
significant investment opportunities based on the possibility that they will be held
liable if they aid and abet human rights abuses in implementing their projects.”).
324
Id., at 235; see supra Part IV for a discussion of the barriers to bringing an ATS
suit that make it difficult for a plaintiff to collect.
325
See supra Part IV.
326
Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
1117, 1139–40 (2001).
327
Cleveland, supra note 269, at 980.
328
See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human
Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 274 (2009).
329
Id.
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investment through promotion of human rights and compliance with
international law.
E. Human Rights Implications
Holding corporations liable under the ATS will encourage the
spread of democracy and human rights, help develop the law,
provide an opportunity for social change, and encourage corporate
compliance to the extent that common goals can be promoted.
Affording disenfranchised individuals in foreign countries the ability
to come into contact with the American judicial system provides the
individual with an experience in which he or she is invited to become
330
a participant in the law. If we wish to export democracy as a foreign
policy objective, the ATS is a perfect vehicle for doing so.
Corporate liability under the ATS will help to develop
331
international and domestic law. Thus, corporate liability will allow
courts the opportunity to further develop the law in this area by
332
examining the difficult issues corporate liability presents. ATS suits
have already helped to “identify which fundamental international
rights norms require state action and which do not,” and have
“inspired the development abroad of mechanisms for human-rights
333
enforcement.”
It is time to move on and accept that corporate
liability under the ATS exists and has in fact existed for years. It is
time to deal with the implications of corporate liability.
Furthermore, allowing corporations to be sued under the ATS
will enable the development of international law to the extent that
individual plaintiffs are permitted to argue what they perceive that law
334
to be.
Currently, international law is the product of states and
intergovernmental organizations. Corporate liability under the ATS
would give individuals a chance to engage in the development of
international law by bringing lawsuits alleging violations of that law.
After all, it is often these individuals who are affected by international
norms of human rights, despite the fact that they oftentimes do not
335
have a say in what those norms are.
Allowing corporations to be
sued under the ATS will likely increase global familiarity with human330

Cf. O’Gara, supra note 270, at 818.
See Cleveland, supra note 269, at 975; Christiana Ochoa, Identifying and Defining
CIL Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 105, 116 (2005).
332
Cleveland, supra note 269, at 975.
333
Id. at 976, 977.
334
Ochoa, supra note 331, at 116.
335
Id. at 116. Presently, a norm is only part of international law when nations are
“persuaded by it.” See Ramsey, supra note 328, at 275.
331
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rights violations and may have the effect of producing wider social
change and adherence to international and human-rights norms,
because corporations extend across national and cultural
336
boundaries.
In addition, corporate liability under the ATS will
encourage corporations to develop—if they have not already—and
337
enforce international law compliance rules and structures. By using
potential liability under the ATS as an incentive to implement
international law compliance regimes, corporations will, in essence,
become self-executing international law entities. The force of the
338
ATS will ensure compliance.
Corporate liability under the ATS
would, and indeed already does, have a direct impact on corporate
behavior in many developing nations and defines the extent to which
companies will engage with foreign governments and to what lengths
339
those corporations will go to make a profit.
These human-rights
implications provide a huge incentive for holding corporations
accountable for their actions by allowing them to be sued under the
ATS.
F.

Foreign Affairs Implications

Corporate liability under the ATS will not severely damage U.S.
foreign relations; to the contrary, it has the potential to facilitate
better international relations between the United States and other
countries. The United States often fails to comply with international
340
legal norms. Corporate liability under the ATS will demonstrate to
the rest of the world that the United States is serious about
promoting human rights, promoting the development of civil society
341
abroad, and increasing constructive engagement.
Corporate liability under the ATS will further the U.S. foreign
342
policy goal of promoting human rights abroad. One of the original
purposes of the ATS was to increase the United States’s prestige
343
among nations. Permitting corporations to be sued under the ATS
336

See generally Holzmeyer, supra note 152.
Cleveland, supra note 269, at 980.
338
Barsa & Dana, supra note 197, at 94; Herz, supra note 323, at 210.
339
Barsa & Dana, supra note 197, at 87.
340
Cf. Shirley V. Scott, The Impact on International Law of US Noncompliance, in
UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 427–28
(Michael Byers ed., 2003).
341
Cf. id.
342
Cleveland, supra note 269, at 985.
343
See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (Edwards, J.,
concurring); D’Amore, supra note 26, at 597.
337
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would further this original purpose.
Specifically, allowing
corporations to be sued pursuant to international law demonstrates
to foreign nations that the United States is serious about human
rights and regards highly international law, so much so that it will
permit international law to govern actions against U.S. corporations.
In addition, corporate liability under the ATS brings established
international human-rights law norms into U.S. jurisprudence and
encourages the development of law in accordance with international
human-rights standards.
Furthermore, corporate liability will promote civil society abroad
344
by encouraging constructive engagement.
One of the United
States’s foreign policy objectives is to encourage and promote
democracy and civil society abroad. Proponents of the constructive
engagement model argue that by virtue of operating in foreign and
developing countries and interacting with locals, American
corporations will convey to those countries and individuals
345
democratic principles and the rule of law.
When corporations
346
violate human rights, the engagement is inevitably unconstructive.
Thus, holding corporations liable under the ATS ensures that when
individuals and nations come into contact with U.S. corporations
abroad, those corporations actually promote and emulate democracy
347
and human rights.
Holding corporations liable under the ATS
would require corporate officials to explain to foreign governments
why they cannot engage in certain illegal activities, thereby
promoting constructive engagement and promoting the formation of
348
democratic principles abroad.
Accordingly, holding corporations
liable under the ATS is, in reality, a means through which the United
States can promote the original purpose of the ATS and its foreign
policy initiatives.
VI. CONCLUSION
Corporations should be held liable under the ATS for violations
344

See Ochoa, supra note 329, at 116; Herz, supra note 323, at 209–10.
Herz, supra note 323, at 209.
346
Cf. id. at 237.
347
Id. at 223.
348
Id. at 228 (stating that liability “will compel companies to explain to
government and military officials at all levels the reasons it cannot tolerate abuses,”
namely “that international law and the U.S. legal system forbid complicity in human
rights violations; that if abuses occur, victims—even the most marginalized
peasants—are entitled to present evidence in a U.S. court against even the most
powerful multinational corporations “).
345
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of the law of nations in accordance with the D.C. Circuit’s holding in
Doe VIII. The Supreme Court should adopt its holding because it is
not only within the original meaning of the ATS, but it is also the
correct rule under both international and domestic law.
In
determining this question, the Supreme Court should look to
domestic, not international law. Contrary to what many have feared,
permitting suits against corporations will not have severe and
detrimental implications for corporations. Instead, holding that
corporations can be sued under the ATS will have a profoundly
positive impact on human rights and foreign policy without severely
deterring corporate productivity and investment.

